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REX S. TOH
SOCK-YONG PHANG
Curbing Urban Traffic Congestion in
Singapore: A Comprehensive Review
One of the most pervasive and frustrating of
modem transportation problems is urban traffic
congestion. For example, the average vehicular
speed dudng peak hours is 11 miles per hour in
Stockholm, 10 in Hong Kong, 7 in London and
Manila, and only 6 in New York and in
Bangkok (where two-hour one-way commutes
on congested streets are not uncommon).' Many
cities around the world have considered or
implemented some form of traffic restraint.^
Singapore is no exception.
Singapore is a small island city-state, about
250 square miles in area, strategically located at
the crossroads of commerce and toudsm at the
southem tip of the Malaysian Peninsula. With a
3.4 million resident population, it has a very
high population density of 13,600 persons per
square mile, compared to 75 in the United
States. Located only three degrees north of the
equator, the country is hot and humid, creating a
heavy demand for air-conditioned pdvate trans-
portation. Singapore now has 350,000 cars (95
percent pdvately owned) out of 650,000 regis-
tered motor vehicles traveling on 1,900 miles of
roads, resulting in a linear density of about 340
motor vehicles per mile. This very high motor
vehicular density compares with only 100 in the
United Kingdom, 69 in lapan, and 44 in the
United States.' More to the point, there are 44
cars per 100 households in Singapore, about
two-and-a half times higher than in Hong Kong,
a comparable city-state.
A major reason for Singapore's love affair
with the car is that economic growth has been
nothing short of phenomenal, averaging 8 per-
cent over the last 30 years. Singapore's per
capita gross national product in 1996 was
S$37,000 or approximately US$26,500 (where
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S$l = US$0.71), comparable to the United
States and exceeding most westem countdes.
Cars are very expensive in Singapore. The pop-
ular Honda Civic (1,600 cc automatic) retails
for about S$149,000 or about US$106,000,
approximately seven times the cost in the
United States, with an accompanying annual
registration fee (road tax) of S$l,440 or close to
US$1,000, about four dmes what it costs to
license a compact car on U.S. roads.
Furthermore, in addition to paying a fortune to
buy a new car in Singapore, the owner has to
decide in advance when and where to drive,
what size car to purchase, and whether it should
be registered as a pdvate or corporate car. Then
one bids for a license to own a car, waits for the
results of the auction, and if successful, pays
US$100,000 for a compact car, installs a smart
card reader on the dashboard to pay for a soon-
to-be-implemented system of automatic tolls,
and then goes through the expedence all over
again in ten years (or whenever one wishes to
purchase a new car).
THE AREA LICENSING SCHEME
The problem of urban traffic congestion in
Singapore reached a peak in 1975 when dudng
the moming and evening msh hours, traffic in
the Central Business Distdct (CBD) crawled at
an average speed of only 12 miles per hour,
prompting the authorities to discourage the
entry of cars into the CBD by instituting an
area-wide system of tolls. Singapore's world
famous Area Licensing Scheme (ALS), the
most comprehensive of its kind in the world,
was implemented in lune 1975, defining a
Restdcted Zone (RZ) of slightly more than two
square miles in the CBD with initially 22 vehic-
ular entry points (now expanded to 33) at its
boundaries. All vehicles except those in the
exempt categodes had to possess and display a
special decal costing S$3 per day or S$60 per
month (double for company registered cars) to
enter the RZ dudng the restdcted times, from
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7:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. Monday through
Saturday. It was hoped that the morning restdc-
tions would have a "mirror image" effect on the
evening retum flow."
Since its inception, the ALS has undergone
numerous changes to the restdcted hours, fees,
and categodes of restdcted vehicles. Today, the
ALS operates from 7:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.
weekdays and from 7:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on
Saturdays, except on public holidays, with
police, emergency vehicles, and scheduled
buses exempted. There are now two types of
ALS licenses: Whole-Day, which costs S$l for
motorcycles and S$3 for other vehicles and
valid for all hours of operation, and Part-Day,
which costs S$0.70 for motorcycles and S$2 for
other vehicles and valid from 9:30 a.m. to 4:30
p.m. on weekdays and 9:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on
Saturdays. Monthly licenses cost 20 times the
pdce of daily licenses, and company vehicles
pay a double rate because the fees are tax
deductible.
As a result of the implementation of the ALS,
affected motorists shifted their trips to just
before and after the restdcted hours to avoid
paying the fee. Note that part-day licenses were
successfully introduced as a form of shoulder
pdcing to help even out the peaks and valleys in
traffic patterns.' In addition, morning and
evening peak hour traffic has been diverted to
new "escape corddors" that bypass the RZ. An
immediate result of the introduction of the ALS
in June 1975 was to reduce the traffic volume
by 45 percent dudng the morning peak hours,
far exceeding the odginal target of 25 to 30 per-
cent, and average speeds went up from 12 to 22
miles per hour.' The introduction of evening
ALS from 4:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and the exten-
sion of restdctions to goods vehicles and motor-
cycles had a similar effect, reducing inbound
evening traffic by 44 percent with traffic speeds
now averaging 20 miles per hour.' The intro-
duction of the ALS also led to a modal shift
from pdvate to public transportation, the latter
of which increased its share from 33 percent to
69 percent.*
The theoredcal foundations of road conges-
tion pdcing for allocative efficiency were first
proposed by Pigou' in 1920 and Knight'" in
1924, and were advocated by the famous
Smeed Report" for use in the United Kingdom
in 1960. Walters in 1961, Thompson in 1962,
Roth in 1967, Vickrey in 1967, Solow in 1973,
Pines and Sadka in 1985, and Mordson in 1986
developed the concepts further.'^ In 1992, a
World Bank economist provided a comprehen-
sive review of the theory of road pdcing and
optimal tolls'^ and in 1994, two researchers sur-
veyed intemational practices in road pdcing.'**
Essentially, economists argue that traffic con-
gestion arises because the marginal user of a
crowded road takes into account only his or her
pdvate cost and ignores the fact that his or her
vehicle slows down and inconveniences others.
Thus the marginal social cost exceeds the mar-
ginal pdvate cost of congested road usage. Neo-
classical welfare theodsts therefore argue for a
Pigouvian toll on the use of congested roads to
increase the individual cost of usage by an
amount equal to the external diseconomies
imposed by one commuter on all others in order
to equate marginal social cost with marginal
socid benefit.
As we have seen, the ALS succeeded in curb-
ing urban road congestion, but perhaps only too
well, since the initial 45 percent reduction in
traffic volumes far exceeded the intended target
of 25 to 30 percent, leading to underutilized
roads and a rationing of road infrastructures that
were no longer scarce. In one of the earliest
articles on the ALS that was published in 1977,
the first author, examining the changed pattem
of drastically reduced traffic flows, had demon-
strated mathematically and by diagrammatic
analysis that the ALS fees were too high, lead-
ing to underutilized roads." At the much lower
traffic volume, the marginal pdvate cost curve
is hodzontal with zero cost elasticity, and since
there is no divergence between the marginal
social cost and marginal pdvate cost, there are
no external diseconomies, thus paradoxically
invalidating the very toll that brought about the
situation. Since then, other studies (using 1975
data) on the ALS have come to the same con-
clusion.'* More troubling, the congestion shifted
to just before and after the restdcted hours and
to the pedpheral dng roads," and those who had
switched to buses contdbuted to increased trav-
el times for all bus dders, leading to a decline in
social welfare.'* However, these problems have
been reduced, given the significant increases in
dng road capacity and the number of buses, and
the opening of a state-of-the-art Mass Rapid
Transit system.
In spite of shortcomings, the ALS has been
very successful in curbing road congestion,
thus it was extended. A linear Road Pricing
Scheme (RPS) was introduced on the East
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Coast Parkway in June 1995 and on the Central
Expressway and Pan Island Expressway in
May 1997. Motorists pay S$2 and motorcy-
clists pay S$0.70 to use these highways from
7:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. Mondays through
Fridays, excepting public holidays. Again, the
monthly license is 20 times the daily cost, and
a valid Whole-Day or Part-Day ALS license
can be used as an RPS license. The allowable
dual usage of the licenses for both the ALS and
RPS created a congestion problem, especially
on the Central Expressway. Thus on July 1,
1997, motorists using the Central Expressway
during the restricted period from 7:30 a.m. to
9:30 a.m. and then entered the CBD had to pur-
chase a Whole-Day license, effectively making
dual usage more expensive. As a result, the
number of motor vehicles using the Central
Expressway fell from 13,000 to 9,000 and traf-
fic speeds improved from an average of 18
mph to 40 mph.
GENERAL PRICE RESTRAINTS
The very high initial tolls and drastic reduc-
tions in peak hour traffic in the CBD reflected a
longstanding policy of restricting the growth of
car usage in Singapore. As early as the 1970s
the govemment had embarked on an aggressive
policy of restraining the rapid growth of cars by
increasing the cost of ownership and operation.
The system of taxation and fees on cars is rather
complex, generally depending on the value and
engine capacity of the car. For illustrative pur-
poses we will consider one car model.
The Open Market Value (OMV) or destina-
tion price c.i.f. on a new Honda Civic (1,600 cc
automatic) is about S$22,(X)0. Singapore impos-
es an ad valorem customs duty of 41 percent on
all imported cars with a Goods and Services
Tax (GST) of 3 percent. On top of this, there is
a high Additional Registration Fee (ARF) equal
to 150 percent of the OMV.
Dealer markups in Singapore are exceptional-
ly high. In a previous comprehensive work on
urban transportation in Singapore published in
1992, the second author had estimated that the
dealer markup on new car sales in Singapore
averaged about 80 percent, but could be as high
as 305 percent for the Maserati Biturbo 220."
However, in a consultant 's report to the
Automobile Association of Singapore prepared
in 1995, the first author discovered that the
average dealer markup on new car sales in
Singapore had dramatically gone up to about
124 percent because of the increased cost and
risk associated with selling new cars (more
about that later).^^ The main reason that the
average markup on new cars in Singapore is
about ten times more than in the United States
is that cars in Singapore are sold by sole distrib-
utors at fixed prices, and the top five comer 63
percent of the new car market.^' Note that
although the sole distributors allow indepen-
dently owned branches to sell their makes, the
distributors control the retail prices. One dealer-
ship, with four independently owned branches,
revealed to one of the authors that the names of
potential customers who initiate negotiations
are keyed into the computer system so that no
other retail branch can negotiate with the cus-
tomer for two weeks (one month for commer-
cial customers), thus the high sustainable
markups on cars because of the total absence of
competition within models. Then there is a one-
time registration fee of S$ 1,000, an annual road
tax of S$ 1,400, insurance of S$500, and a
Certificate of Entitlement (COE) quota premi-
um of S$54,000, which constitutes the May
1997 auction price of a license to own a car in
that engine capacity category (to be discussed
later).
Summarizing, for the month of May 1997, the
cost components of a privately licensed new
Honda Civic in Singapore would be approxi-
mately as follows:
OMV SS22,000
Import tax (41 percent of OMV) 9,000
GST (3 percent of OMV plus import tax) 1,000
ARF (150 percent of OMV) 33,000
Dealer markup (124 percent of OMV) 27,000
Registration fee 1,000
Road tax 1,500
Insurance 500
COE 54.000
Total S$149,000
Note that of the total price of S$149,000 on the
Honda Civic, the govemment collects about
S$ 100,000 in taxes and fees, or about two-
thirds the retail price of the new car.
Given the high taxes on new cars to discour-
age increased car ownership to help curb traffic
congestion in Singapore, one would expect peo-
ple to switch to one of the world's best systems
of public transportation,^^ or at least to purchase
small "inexpensive" stripped-down cars. In
1996, the Mercedes Model E, which costs
S$300,000, overtook the Honda Civic to
become the best selling new car model in
Singapore. This rather paradoxical turn of
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events can be explained by the Third Law of
Demand (the Alchain and Allen Theorem),
which postulates that where there is a dramatic
change in relative prices (the luxurious
Mercedes Model E is now only twice as expen-
sive as the humble Honda Civic), the substitu-
tion effect predominates. That is to say, where-
as the Mercedes Model E used to cost three
times as much as the Honda Civic, since the
former is now "only" twice as expensive as the
latter, the Mercedes becomes a good buy.
A peculiar system of tax rebates called the
Preferential Additional Registration Fee
(PARF) has been in existence since 1975.
Concemed that high pdces for new cars would
encourage motorists to keep their cars for
longer periods, conseqtiently increasing the
average age of cars on the road leading to more
frequent traffic-slowing breakdowns, the gov-
emment offered car owners a percentage reduc-
tion (up to 65 percent in one instance) on the
ARF on new pdvately owned cars if an old car
in the same engine capacity group or larger is
scrapped or reexported before the end of its
tenth year. This created an instant market for
scrap cars, and as the price of new cars rose
steadily with infiation, accompanied by a dse in
the value of the Japanese yen and coupled with
a dse in the ARF rate itself, the value of the dis-
counted PARF associated with scrap cars rose
correspondingly. In one instance, the Mazda
929 (which falls within the engine capacity
group of 2,001 cc to 3,000 cc) cost S$31, 000 in
1979. Ten years later in 1989 the same car
could be sold for scrap at a pdce of S$44,000 to
get the PARF on a more expensive Mercedes.
In no other country in the world is a car an
appreciating asset (incidentally, this creates an
actuarial nightmare for insurers and leasing
companies). This perverse unintended anomaly
led some people to purchase cheap cars with
large engine capacities from Russia and Eastem
Europe for their ultimate speculative scrap
value.^' For this reason and others, the PARF
system went through many changes. But as it
now stands, for cars registered after November
1, 1990, the lump sum value of a PARF rebate
is equal to 80 percent of the OMV of the old car
at the time of its registration, and this can be
used to offset the ARF on any new car. Cars
that are ten years old or older are required to
pay a surcharge on the road tax equal to 10 per-
cent a year beyond ten years, up to a maximum
of 50 percent—once again as an inducement to
get older cars off the road.
To discourage car usage, Singapore imposes
either a 50 percent ad valorem tax on gasoline
or a duty of US$1.60 per U.S. gallon, whichev-
er is higher, so that the retail price of gas is
around US$3.30 per U.S. gallon. To discourage
Singaporeans from ddving north to Malaysia to
refill their tanks with cheaper gas, the govem-
ment passed a law called the "Half-Tank Rule,"
which requires Singapore registered cars to
have at least half a tank of gas (later changed to
three quarters) when leaving Singapore and
before entering Malaysia. Later on the same
day. Parliament passed another law making it
illegal to drive a motor vehicle with a faulty
fuel gauge.
To further discourage car usage in the
restricted zone, parking rates in the CBD were
pedodically increased so that today, the rates
are $0.90 per half hour between 8:30 a.m. and
5:00 p.m., and half the amount dudng nonpeak
hours. Outside the CBD where there is less
congestion, the parking rates are S$0.45 per
half hour dudng enforcement hours, from 8:30
a.m. to 10:00 p.m.
As we have seen, Singapore has aggressively
used pricing policies to discourage both the
ownership as well as the usage of cars. '^' Thus
today, 51 percent of all motodzed tdps are by
public transport, 3,(MX),(X)0 by bus, and another
700,000 by the Mass Rapid Transit system.
However, in spite of the significant shift to pub-
lic transportation, with little tolerance for traffic
congestion in a country built on commerce and
dependent on toudsm, the govemment decided
that high pdces were insufficient deterrents to
the use of pdvate motor vehicles. For instance,
in 1989, because of a high economic growth
rate (9.6 percent), there was a 9 percent increase
in the number of cars over the previous year,
much in excess of the long-term average growth
rate of 4.2 percent, and very much greater than
the average 1 percent annual growth in the
number of miles of roads in Singapore.
Reporting to the Parliamentary Select
Committee on Land Transportation, the second
author had computed the income elasticity of
demand for cars to be around 1.0, whereas the
pdce elasticity was only -0.45, meaning that
the demand for cars in Singapore is ddven more
by increasing incomes than deterred by increas-
ing pdces.-' Partly based on this discovery, the
Committee concluded that in view of
Singapore's land constraints and robust econo-
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my, the number of motor vehicles had to be
controlled and kept below the level that the then
existing ineffective pricing mechanism would
permit. The Comitiittee then went on to recom-
mend a quota on the maximum annual increase
in the number of motor vehicles.
THE QUOTA SYSTEM
The quota system on new cars (the only one
of its kind in the world^), implemented on May
1, 1990, has been extensively discussed and
analyzed in previous studies by both authors
working independently." All motor vehicles
except scheduled and school buses and emer-
gency vehicles are subject to fixed allocations.
Two systems of allocating the quotas were con-
sidered—by free balloting as in a lottery, and
by silent auction. It was felt that while balloting
is more equitable, motor vehicles would not
necessarily go to people who need them most.
An auction was considered more desirable on
efficiency grounds, because the vehicles would
be allocated to owners who are willing to pay
the most for them, thus maximizing social wel-
fare. The Quota System, like most other mea-
sures to curb traffic congestion in Singapore,
has undergone numerous changes. As it now
stands, anyone who wants to buy a new motor
vehicle must bid at an auction (held once a
month) for a Certificate of Entitlement (COE)
to own a car for ten years, in line with the exist-
ing litnit for PARF benefits.^ * If the vehicle is
scrapped or re-exported before the ten-year
period expires, the owner receives a pro-rated
rebate of the paid quota premium. If the owner
chooses to keep the vehicle beyond ten years,
he or she will not be required to bid for a new
COE, but will have to pay the prevailing quota
premium (based on the moving average of the
past twelve months) for the appropriate catego-
ry of vehicles in order to revalidate the entitle-
ment for another ten years (the fee is halved for
a five-year extension). To prevent those who
can afford bigger cars from outbidding those
who can afford only snialler cars, there are four
categories for cars of different engine capacity
groups, one category for goods vehicles and
buses, one for motorcycles, and an open catego-
ry to allow some leeway for market forces to
determine the vehicular mix.
The quota for each of the seven categories is
announced in advance. Bidding is done elec-
tronically by sealed tender accompanied by a
returnable deposit equal to half the tendered
amount. But instead of charging successful ten-
derers what they had bid, thereby appropriating
all constimer surplus through perfect price dis-
crimination, it was decided that everyone on the
high side will pay the lowest successful tender
price, referred to as the "quota premium," for
the respective vehicle category.** Again, compa-
ny cars must pay twice the amount because the
quota premiums are tax deductible.'"
Upon implementation of the Quota System,
speculative activity soon became rampant
because of ever increasing quota premiums.
Between May 1990 and July 1992, 86 percent
of new cars were registered using COEs (which
were originally good for six months and trans-
ferable only once before being used to register a
vehicle) purchased in the secondary market.
Today, each individual can submit only one bid
in each tender exercise, firms can make any
number of bids, but car dealers cannot, and
COEs for the car and motorcycle categories are
now nontransferable. Although technically
barred fiom participating in auctions, car deal-
ers in Singapore continue to submit bids on
behalf of their customers. A potential buyer will
put up S$5,000 to bid for flie COE that the deal-
er will tender on his or her behalf, advancing
the tender deposit. If the bid is successful, the
deal goes through, otherwise the dealer will try
again in the next tender exercise. Prices of cars
were quoted inclusive of the prices of COEs. If
the quota premium was below the contract
amount, there is usually a rebate, but if it was
above the contract amount, the dealer will usu-
ally split the difference evenly, thus assuming
some risks, not unlike selling short on the stock
market. Dealers also bid through proxies, pay-
ing relatives and friends between S$50 and
S$100 to use their names, register the cars
under their names, and then arrange for the
transfer of car ownership when it is actually
sold after paying a transfer fee of 2 percent of
the car's value. This practice came to be known
as "double transfer" in the trade, and accounted
for about one third of all new car sales between
January and September 1994.'' Altogether in
one way or another, the 28 sole distributors in
Singapore controlled more than two-thirds of all
the bidding, and therefore could more or less
predict what the quota premiums wotild be for
each category of vehicles. They routinely trad-
ed, lent, or borrowed COEs from one another.
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Having comered the market for COEs, the deal-
ers were also selling cars as "investments,"
since the price of the COE kept going up."
Because of ever increasing demand for cars, by
late 1994 and for two categodes of vehicles, the
quota premium exceeded S$ 100,000. The point
bears repeating. Singaporeans were willing to
pay upwards of US$70,000 for the dght to own
a car for ten years.
On Febmary 19, 1995, in order to discourage
double transfers and to break the stranglehold
of the car dealers on the market for COEs, the
govemment banned the transfer of cars within
three months of first registration, among other
things. Using multiple input transfer function
noise and lag polynomial models, the second
author discovered that with the new curbs, spec-
ulators were less able to comer the market for
windfall gains.''
When the Quota System was first introduced
in May 1990, the quota premium for a Honda
Civic (considered a medium-sized car) was a
mere S$l,800. By May 1997, seven years later
and in spite of all the measures taken by the
government to minimize speculation and
monopoly, the quota premium had gone up to
S$54,000, since on average the number of bids
tendered is about twice the allocated quota of
approximately 3,500 cars a month. Quota pre-
miums fluctuate with demand, which in turn
depends on the state of the growing economy,
the pdce of imported cars, additional restraints
on vehicular ownership and usage imposed by
the government, consumer psychology, and
speculative activity. In previous studies, both
authors working independently showed that by
introducing the quota system, Singapore has
achieved certainty in the maximum number of
new motor vehicle registrations each year, but
at the expense of the public's anxiety over fluc-
tuating pdces.'" In other words, the problem of
uncertainty has not been solved—it has merely
been shifted. A pdod, which kind of uncertain-
ty causes larger welfare losses cannot be
determined.
PARALLEL IMPORTS AND COOPERATIVES
Frustrated with the high dealer markups and
their stranglehold on the COE market, indepen-
dent dealers have started to engage in what has
been called "parallel imports" of cars into
Singapore to challenge the sole distributors'
monopoly. This had an immediate downward
effect on the retail pdce of targeted models. For
instance, pdor to the parallel importation of the
subcompact Nissan March (1,000 cc), the sole
distdbutor was selling the model at S$76,000
inclusive of COE. But with parallel imports of
that model, the pdce dropped to S$69,500,
despite higher COE pdces, while the parallel
importers were seUing it at between S$65,900
and S$66,800." Sole distdbutors have threat-
ened to retaliate by comering the market for
COEs by bidding them up through their
prospective buyers (by May 1997 the quota pre-
mium for small cars at or below 1,000 cc
reached a peak of S$36,000). They have also
tried to frighten off purchasers of parallel
imports by implying that cars made for Japan
and Europe are unsuitable for the tropics, and
that they will not service these cars, which can
be singled out by their vehicle identification
numbers. Meanwhile NTUC Income, a trade
union insurance company, plans to help its poli-
cy holders import their own cars and assist in
arranging for freight and insurance.
Furthermore, it intends to parallel import small
cars to be used in an expedmental car shadng
cooperative in two housing estates starting in
June 1997, along the lines of those found in
Germany, Switzerland, and Bdtain. Each coop-
erative will have about 75 to 100 members shar-
ing five cars and paying a one-time entrance fee
of S$100, S$100 in annual subscdptions, and a
rental fee of S$9 per hour for the use of a car. If
the scheme proves popular, it will be extended
to other housing estates. This is a very signifi-
cant development, because 85 percent of
Singaporeans Hve in very dense high-dse hous-
ing estates, and Singapore may be the most
ideal country in the world for jointly owned and
operated car cooperatives. Parallel imports and
car cooperatives represent the first incursions
into the monopolistic stranglehold of the sole
distdbutors. Finally, the rules of the game have
been changed.
WEEKEND CAR SCHEME
In May 1991, Singapore implemented an
unusual program called the Weekend Car
Scheme to encourage the use of private cars
during off-peak hours. Motorists were given
financial incentives such as a 70 percent dis-
count on the annual road tax and rebates on the
registration fee, import duty, and COE quota
premium up to a maximum of S$15,000 if they
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register their new cars as weekend cars, which
can be used only from 3:00 p.m. on Saturday
and the whole of Sunday and public holidays,
as well as from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on week-
days. The cars are identified by red license
plates fixed with tamper-proof special screws
and coded seals and accompanied by stiff fines
(in the thousands of dollars) for usage viola-
tions. To accommodate emergencies, each
weekend car is given five free daily coupons
per year and additional coupons can be pur-
chased for S$20 each.
Although the Weekend Car Scheme was
implemented in response to popular public
demand and was well intentioned, it became a
public relations embarrassment because of its
unintended effects. As it tumed out, many of
the weekend cars were either luxury cars enjoy-
ing the 70 percent discount on the high annual
road tax and the other financial incentives, or
the second or third cars belonging to affluent
households. Also, the owner of a Porsche 911
(3,600 cc) would enjoy a S$4,400 savings on
the annual road tax, which alone would pay for
a lot of daily licenses. In July 1994, the newly
introduced Weekend Car COE cost S$27,000
while the COE for a car in the large category
(2,001 cc and more) was SS65,000. Thus a per-
son registering a large car as a weekend car
could save $38,000 on the COE quota premium
and also enjoy the maximum rebate of
S$15,000 on import taxes, etc. The upfront sav-
ings of S$53,000 on a luxury car were enough
to purchase ten years of S$20 daily coupons.
The redistributional effects were widely per-
ceived to be unfair to the less wealthy.
Responding to public dissatisfaction of rich
people purchasing luxury weekend cars for
daily use, the govemment revamped the scheme
in October 1994. The new Off-Peak Car
Scheme with the same hours of restriction
offers the same tax incentives regardless of car
engine capacity: a fiat S$17,000 rebate at the
time of registration, and a flat $800 discount on
the annual road tax. The specially created
Weekend Car COE category was removed.
Rich and poor are now treated equally.
ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING
As we have seen, despite the pent-up demand
for cars, the ALS/RPS has succeeded in curbing
urban traffic congestion in Singapore. But the
schemes are manually operated and have
become more complicated over time, with four-
teen types of licenses (Whole-Day ALS, Part-
Day ALS/RPS, and daily and monthly licenses
for three categories of restricted vehicles, pri-
vately and company owned). Motorists must fig-
ure out what type of license to buy, and visual
enforcement by the police has become very dif-
ficult as vehicles are not obliged to slow down
as they approach the gantry (entry) points.
Moreover, the different licenses can be illegally
switched among vehicles and enforcement in
this regard is by the honor system. The ALS and
RPS are also very labor-intensive, requiring
more than 120 personnel to manage the system.
But perhaps the most important drawback of the
ALS/RPS from the perspective of allocative
efficiency pertains to the unlimited number of
entries into the RZ, resulting in under-penalized
contributions to traffic congestion, and making it
difficult to equate marginal social costs with
marginal social benefits. Thus the need to switch
to Electronic Road Pricing (ERP).
As early as 1989, anticipating advances in
smart card technology, the government
announced plans to introduce ERP and invited
firms to submit tenders for a viable "active"
system. (A "passive" system involving detailed
monthly bills giving breakdowns of toll sites
crossed that was tried in Hong Kong on an
experimental basis from July 1983 to March
1985 had proven to be unpopular because of
privacy concems and was rejected."*) Numerous
trials were conducted, and after successive
rounds of demonstrations and tenders, in
October 1995 the government awarded the
S$197 million ERP construction contract to a
consortium comprising Philips Singapore,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Miyoshi
Electronics, and CEI Systems and Engineering.
The consortium will also maintain the system
for five years for another S$39 million. An effi-
cient, almost fail-proof system is expected to be
in place by early 1998.
A detailed, technically illustrated description
of the technology involved can be found in a
recent joint study by the authors." Briefly, each
type of motor vehicle (car, taxi, commercial
vehicle, and motorcycle) will be fitted with a
small color-coded In-Vehicle Unit (IU) on the
bottom right comer of the windscreen or the
center of the motorcycle's handlebar, with the
IU connected to the motor vehicle's battery.
The IU will debit the toll from a Cashcard
(ubiquitously available and launched in 1996 at
a cost of S$40 million to help tum Singapore
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into a cashless society) every time the vehicle
passes under a set of gantdes. The IU has a liq-
uid crystal display that will indicate the card's
stored-value balance and confirms every trans-
action with a beep. It also alerts the driver
whenever cash balances are low or the smart
card is faulty. The IUs will be permanently
affixed so they cannot be swapped among dif-
ferent categories of vehicles, which will be
charged varying rates to reflect vehicle size.
Foreign motodsts (mostly from Malaysia) may
rent temporary IUs or install permanent ones if
they visit Singapore regularly.
Entry point gantdes will work in pairs. The
first gantry will have antennas which, using
radio frequencies, will check the validity of
stored-value Cashcards in approaching vehicles
after mutual vedfication, after which it will exe-
cute debiting instructions to the IU. The second
gantry has a set of optical vehicle presence
detectors which pinpoints the location and type
of the vehicle. A second set of antennas on the
second gantry vedfies if the correct deduction
has been made by identifying the type of vehi-
cle passing through. An outstation controller
located by the roadside links the information
from the antennas and vehicle presence detec-
tors to check for possible violations. If viola-
tions are detected, enforcement cameras mount-
ed on the first gantry record the image of the
rear license plate of the violating vehicle, then
forward it to a central computer with the trans-
action record for a fine.
Note that the ERP system to be implemented
does not have toll booths or lane dividers and
does not require vehicles to slow down. This
requires the system to be able to handle clut-
tered vehicles traveling up to 75 miles per hour
in a multilane traffic pattem with consecutive
passings and lane changes as well as very close
parallel passings with motorcycles in between.
Since it takes 0.4 seconds for the algodthm to
be completely sequenced, the set of two gantdes
must be placed at least 17 yards apart. The per-
missible error rate is set at 1 error per 100,000
passings. Every attempt will be made to ensure
that the errors are not of the false identification
kind in order not to erode public confidence in
the system. It is expected that initially, ERP will
exactly duplicate the present ALS and RPS, but
eventually, ERP is expected to be progressively
extended to first cover check points along
expressways and then to congested artedal dng
roads by the year 2000.
From the welfare perspective, the greatest
advantage of ERP is that charges per entry are
more allocatively efficient than timed interval
licenses with multiple entry privileges. Every
time a vehicle enters, exits, or reenters the RZ, it
contributes to road congestion and generates
extemal diseconomies which should and will be
penalized. In this respect, the ERP is a definite
improvement over the ALS and RPS. Further-
more, it has been suggested that toll charges can
be made to vary with time, area, or distance
traveled to reflect varying levels of road conges-
don.'* With ERP, it is also easier to introduce
gradually tapedng shoulder pdces to even out
traffic flow, as was achieved with the two-tier
Whole-Day and Part-Day ALS. Ultimately the
vehicle detectors can help in determining traffic
volume, level of congestion, and adjust the opti-
mal tolls accordingly to achieve Pareto optimeil-
ity in road allocation. Furthermore, the proposed
ERP system in Singapore has some built-in effi-
ciencies in that, unlike toll booths in other parts
of the world, cars will not have to slow down,
saving on time and gas. In other words, the ERP
system in Singapore will be operationally non-
intrusive. Also, the depleted Cashcards can be
topped up at banks and automated teller
machines, and can be used for almost every-
thing else eventually. The system is almost fool-
proof and fraud-proof. People will not be acci-
dentally caught with the wrong license used at
the wrong time or place, and permanently fixed
IUs are not removable or interchangeable,
unlike present area licenses. The cameras will
provide documentary proof of violations, and at
a maximum false positive error rate of 1 in
100,000, protestations of system error will not
be terdbly persuasive.
Realizing that the legitimate car owning aspi-
rations of middle class Skfp^oreans should not
be unreasonably curtaile(|," the govemment has
announced that with the iinplementation of ERP
in March 1998, the annual quota of about
40,(K)0 new motor vehicles will be increased by
9 to 12 percent. We believe that this is a wise
move because ownership does not cause con-
gesdon, only usage does. And because of its
fiexibility, ERP can take Singapore to the first-
best world of Pareto optimality in allocating
scarce road space. But the govemment has inti-
mated that the state-of-the-art ERP system will
be in place for only ten years, and then it will be
dismantled in favor of an even more sophisticat-
ed automatic monitodng and collection system
32 TRANSPORTATION JOURNAL Winter
using satellite technology.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Since 1975, Singapore has introduced a
relentless sedes of traditional and expedmental
measures to slow down the growth of the motor
vehicle population and to control its usage. We
have seen that while some of the measures have
been somewhat successful, some of the prob-
lems were shifted or were substituted. The ALS
led to a shifting of the problem in time and
place while the quota system has substituted
uncertainty in quantity with uncertainty in
pdce. Furthermore, the PARF system and the
Quota System had the unintentional effect of
creating an appreciating asset market for motor
vehicles encouraging speculation, while the
well intentioned Weekend Car Scheme resulted
in some undesirable redistdbutional effects.
Despite the shortcomings, because Singapore
had taken such bold measures to tackle the
problem of urban traffic congestion, officials
from Brunei, China, Hong Kong, Japan,
Malaysia, the Repubhc of Korea, Taiwan, and
the United Kingdom (among others) have come
to study Singapore's road transport policies.
Academics from all over the world and the
World Bank have wdtten scores of leamed arti-
cles on the measures undertaken by Singapore
to curb congestion. Although there are clear
lessons to be leamed from the successes and
mistakes, it is important to bear in mind that
many of these measures to curb road congestion
are implementable in Singapore only because it
is a small island with a transportation grid
almost totally insulated from foreign motodsts,
has a strong unwavedng govemment committed
to solving the problem, and an obedient, law-
abiding citizenry. In this respect, Singapore is
almost unique. The draconian measures that
Singapore has taken to curb urban traffic con-
gestion cannot be implemented in the United
States for obvious political reasons.
Until very recently, both of the authors had
been independently studying and wdting on the
problem of urban traffic congestion in
Singapore for a long time. While the second
author found that the income elasticity of
demand for the ownership of cars was 1.0, the
first author found that the price elasticity of
demand for the usage of cars was -2.54^Thus
whereas an increase in the pdce of cars will not
sedously discourage their purchase, a nation-
wide system of automatic tolls will sedously
discourage their usage. Since usage and not
ownership causes congestion, we are now both
of the opinion that ERP is the ultimate solution
to Singapore's road congestion problem
because it is flexible, efficient, operationally
nonintmsive, and most importantly, effective in
putting Singapore in the first-best world of
Pareto optimality. In the meantime, the world
waits and watches to see the results of this bold
and interesting experiment conducted on an
unprecedented scale.
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